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ECONOMIC INTEREST-SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS
PETER C. MAXFIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The revenue codes since 1913 have provided for depletion in
the exploitation of minerals. However, the criteria to be applied
in determining whether the depletion deduction is allowable have
never been prescribed by Congress. In 1933 the Supreme Court
in Palmer v. Bender, set forth the definition, which with some
qualification is applied today, that an economic interest exists in
"every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment,
any interest in the . . . [mineral] in place, and secures, by any
form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of
the ... [mineral] to which he must look for a return of his capital."1
2
This two-part definition which was adopted and has been perpetuated
in the regulations8 requires a certain prerequisite interest in the
taxpayer and it is this first element of the definition with which
this paper primarily concerns itself. The second element requires
essentially an economic dependence on production only as the means
for capital recovery. The risk of the lack of mineral or production
must have been assumed by the taxpayer in order to qualify under
this second element. For example, if a taxpayer ostensibly has
been assigned all right to a certain mineral in place but the quantity
of mineral or the 'amount of production obtainable has been guar-
anteed by the transferor, taxpayer is not dependent on production
for a return of capital. Rather, the risk of production has been
retained in effect by transferor since it is he and not taxpayer
who will lose if there is insufficient production. Therefore, taxpayer
will not be held to have acquired a depletable economic interest.'
Nevertheless, it appears presently settled within the 'limits dis-
cussed below5 that one who owns an interest in the mineral fee
* Assoc. Prof. of Law, University of Wyoming, J.D. 1966, University of Denver, LL.M.,
1968, Harvard University.
1. 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
2. Id. at 557.
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b).(1) (1954).
4. See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940) ; Christie v. United States, 436 F.2d
1216 (5th Cir. 1971); Donnell, 48 T.C. 552 (1967); Landreth, 50 T.C. 803 (1968) ; Hol-
brook, 54 T.C. 1617 (1970). Contra, Vest v. CIR, 32 AFTR 2d 73-5209 (5th Cir. 1973) (an
unsettling decision holding an economic interest existed despite taxpayer's right to look for
a return of his capital to extraction not only from his own land but also from neighboring
lands and from other sources completely unrelated to extraction).
6. See text accompanying notes 62-64, infra.
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estate or the leasehold has the requisite economic interest.
6 In
addition one who owned such an interest and assigned it retaining
one of the following interests would have an economic interest:
1.) Royalty7 is a share in gross production of the proceeds
from the sales of production reserved by the lessor under a mineral
lease free of all development and operating costs. The fact that
the royalty or other nonoperating interest is payable on a fixed
price per unit of production basis rather than a percentage of net
or gross production or proceeds from the sale thereof should not
.appear to vitiate the economic interest status of the interest in
question.
8
2.) Overriding Royalty9 is typically a cost free royalty created
by the mineral lessee generally, but not necessarily, as the result
of an assignment of the lease out of which the overriding royalty
is reserved.
3.) Net Profit Interest ° is an interest that gives the holder
no operating rights but entities him to a specified percentage of
the net proceeds from production. Net proceeds are usually defined
as a specified percentage of gross income less the interest owner's
proportionate share of the operating costs and in some instances
of the costs of development. Although the Supreme Court has held
in both Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner" and Burton-Sutton
Oil Co.12 that a net profits interest is an -economic interest, the
Court did not expressly overrule Elbe Oil Land Development Co.
13
or Helvering v. O'Donnell'
14 wherein the court previously held that
a net profit -interest was not an economic -interest.
15 However, be-
cause of the Kirby and Burton-Sutton cases and a more recent
Supreme Court decision"
8 the revenue service has accepted the view
that a net profits interest can be an economic interest at least
where one in the chain of title to the operating (either the fee
or the mineral leasehold) remains the same.1
7
6. Greensboro Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1935).
7. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 554 (1932).
8. See Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932) Tres. Regs. §
1.613-2(c) (5) ex. But see text accompanying notes 41-45, infra.
9. Hogan v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1944).
10. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Conmissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
11. 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
12. 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
13. 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
14. 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
15. GCM 22730, 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 214, wherein the revenue service so construed the
two cases cited immediately above as holding that a net profits interest is not an economic
interest.
16. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
17. BEv. RUL. 69-332, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 87 ; Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1 (a) (2) (1954).
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4.) Production Payment"' -is an interest under which the holder
is to receive a specified portion of the production until he has
received a specified amount. The holder of this interest is deemed
to have an economic interest in only certain circumstances due
to the 1939 Tax Reform Act.19
5.) Extraction which is trespassory will probably not give rise
to an allowable depletion allowance in light of two Fifth Circuit
holdings that one does not have an economic interest in oil produced
from wells which are illegally bottomed outside the limits of the
leasehold and therefore depletion on such production is not allow-
able.
20
The discussion above has dealt with the question of whether
an interest holder in the chain of title to the operating interest
possesses an economic interest. This, based on decisions issuing
from the Supreme Court, appears to be settled and the recent Su-
preme Court decision of Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration
Co. 21 appears to expressly so acknowledge.
It is to be noted that in each of the prior cases where the
taxpayer had had a sufficient economic interest to entitle
him to depletion, he has once had at least a fee or leasehold
in the oil-producing properties themselves.
22
II. ECONOMIC INTEREST EXTERIOR TO CHAIN OF TITLE
Because of four Supreme Court decisions, i.e., Helvering v. Bank-
line Oil Co., 28 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.,24 Parsons
v. Smith,2 5 and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner26 when
one is not in the chain of title to the operating interest (whether
leasehold or mineral fee) and either transfers money or property
or agrees to perform some labor or process whether in the explora-
tion, development, production, or post-production or manufacturing
stage, in consideration for either a percentage of production or
a fixed price per unit of production, uncertainty exists as to whether
such consideration received constitutes an economic interest. The
Bankline Oil case involved a taxpayer who operated a casinghead
gasoline plant which extracted gasoline from wet or natural gas.
18. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); United States v. Witte, 306 F.2d 81, 87
(5th Cir. 1962).
19. P. MAXFIELD, THE INCOME TAXATION OF MINING OPERATIONS 180 et seq. (1973).
20. Commissioner v. Donnell, 417 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Harrington v. Commissioner,
404 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. 350 U.S. 808 (1956).
22. Id. at 814-15.
23. 303 U.S. 362 (1988).
24. 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
25. 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
26. 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
459
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By contract with the oil producers, taxpayer provided pipelines from
the well casingheads to its plant where it extracted the gasoline
paying the producers a one-third of the gross proceeds derived
from the sale of the gasoline. Taxpayer argued unsuccessfully
that it was entitled to depletion on the difference between the fair
market value of the wet gas at the wellhead and the price it was
required to pay for it. The Court, noting that taxpayer played no
part in and had no control over the production process, concluded
that taxpayer had no investment in gas in place and therefore
no economic interest. Though the taxpayer was looking to extraction
for a return of its capital, there was a failure to satisfy the first
of the two part definition in Palmer v. Bender,27 i.e., the relationship
was insufficient to justify a conclusion of ownership of mineral
in place. The impact of the language was that formal ownership
of the lease or fee interest was not a necessary prerequisite to
a conclusion of ownership in place but rather that sufficient involve-
ment in the production process with some right to production would
suffice. As of this decision, however, the Supreme Court had not
formulated the chain of title concept referred to above.
In Southwest Exploration taxpayer sought to obtain leases on
off-shore oil deposits owned by the State of California. California
law provided that the leases were conditioned upon, and that oil
could be extracted only if the wells were drilled on filled land
or were slant drilled from upland sites adjacent to the oil deposits.
There being no available filled land, taxpayer obtained a right to
drill from an upland site in consideration for 24.5 per cent of the
net profits from extraction and sale of the oil. It should be noted
that the agreement between the upland owners and the taxpayer
provided that the former would acquire no interest in the lease
or oil deposit. The Supreme Court held that the upland owners and
not the taxpayers were entitled to depletion on the 'amounts paid
to the former emphasizing that the contribution of the upland owners
was absolutely essential to the extraction or production of oil. In
this decision the Supreme Court articulated the chain of title concept
referred to above and contracted, in this author's view, the holding
of Bankline by ruling that one who is not in the chain of title
must demonstrate an essential contribution in order to qualify for
the depletion allowance.
In Parsons the taxpayer, a mining contractor, entered into an
oral agreement with the owner of coal lands to strip mine the
coal for a fixed price per ton of coal produced and delivered to
the fee owner. The taxpayer was to furnish all equipment and
labor; however, the contract was terminable by the fee owner on
27. 287 U.S. 551. 557 (1933).
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ten days' notice. The Court cited the above quoted test originating
with Palmer v. Bender" ' and concluded that taxpayer had no invest-
ment in coal in place and therefore no economic interest for the
reason that petitioner's investments were in their equipment, all
of which was movable, not in the coal in place. The Court further
determined that the investments in equipment were recoverable
through depreciation, not depletion, that the contracts were complete-
ly terminable without cause on short notice, that the landowners
did not agree to surrender and did not actually surrender to petition-
ers any capital interest in the coal in place and that the coal
at all times, even after it was mined, belonged entirely to the
landowners. Finally, the Court concluded that petitioners could not
sell or keep any of it but were required to deliver all that they
mined to the landowners and that petitioners were not to have any
part of the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but, on the contrary,
they were to be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and delivered.
This, quoting the terms of the contract in a companion case,"
was agreed to be in "full compensation for the full performance
of all work and for the furnishing of all [labor] and equipment
required for the work." In conclusion, the petitioners, thus, agreed
to look only to the landowners for all sums to become due them
under their contracts.8 0
Paragon Jewel was in most respects similar to Parsons, except
that no express provision was made for the landowner's terminating
at will. The Court again concluded that the mining contractor had
no economic interest, holding the Bankline and Parsons cases to
be controlling. 1 Southwest Exploration was distinguished on the
ground that here not only did the mining contractors not receive
a fixed percentage of proceeds rather than a fixed price per ton,
but also in this case the mining contractors were not essential
parties to the extraction of production process.
2
Because of Southwest Exploration, Parsons and Paragon Jewel
considerations, much confusion has been generated. If Bankline only
had been applied to the Paragon facts, the result might well have
been otherwise. However, Southwest Exploration required an appli-
cation of the essentiality test because -the Court did not view the
contractor as standing in the chain of title.83 It might be noted,
however, that the mining contractors -in. Parsons and Paragon Jewel
might well have been considered lessees or sublessees and therefore
28. Id.
29. Huss v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 218 (1959).
80. Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 225 (1959).
31. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
32. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 850 U.S. 308 (1956).
38. Id. at 317,
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in the chain of title. As will be further discussed below, ,the economic
interest argument would still have failed in Parsons because the
mining contractor's rights were terminable. Nevertheless, in form
it would seem that the mining contractor in those cases could be
viewed as having assumed the position of a lessee or sublessee.
In Paragon, however, neither party argued for -lease treatment.
In any event, casting the transaction as a lease would have put
the mining contractor in the chain of title and thereby probably
avoided the need to apply the essentiality test."
Taking separately the considerations relied on in the cases, it
might be helpful to examine the significance that the lower courts,
the revenue service, and the commentators have given them. The
considerations raised in Parsons will be examined first, followed
by a look at the essentiality requirement raised in Southwest and
applied again in Paragon.
A. INVESTMENT IN THE MINERAL
In Parsons and Paragon the mining contractors invested in mov-
able equipment and nothing in their putative mineral interests. Does
this disqualifying factor mean that cash consideration or other prop-
erty must be given for the mineral interest itself? Many oil and
gas leases have been given for no consideration whatsoever except
the promise to develop. Is the tax status of the latter now unsettled
because of the lack of initial consideration? In no case subsequent
to the above two was the actual investment consideration alone
determinative or determinative in conjunction with some of the
weaker considerations set forth in the two cases. 85 A Court of Claims
decision directly responsive to Parsons and Paragon has held that
an investment in a plant and equipment is an investment in the
minerals in place. 6 Additionally, the revenue service appears to
have ignored the actual investment factor in a recent ruling. 7
One authority concludes that the investment factor carried to the
extreme is contrary to the Congressional intent in granting the
depletion allowance. 8 It is unfortunate that this point was ever
made in the context of the Parsons and Paragon facts because
of the uncertainty that was injected and because of the literal indif-
ference in the statute allowing percentage or statutory depletion
to cost or investment in the mineral' property. The emphasis in
34. See REV. RuL. 73-32, 1973-1 CUM. BULL. 301.
35. See Rissler & McMurray Co., Inc. v. United States, 32 AFTR 2d 73-5194 (10th Cir.
1973) ; Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969).
36. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 348 F.2d 921, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1965)
see also Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571 (1967).
37. See REV. RUL. 73-32, 1973-1 Cum. BULL. 301.
38. Williams, Th Economic Interest Concept, P-H NAT. RES. TAixs, 1010 (1972).
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Paragon and Parsons on investment in depreciables as a basis
for the disallowance of depletion might be interpreted as stemming
from a disagreement with or misunderstanding of the basic allow-
ance of percentage depletion vel non which allowance typically in-
volves a recovery of more than the investment made in the property.
B. TERMINABILITY
In Parsons the reliance on terminability of the relationship by
the transferors appears somewhat -settled. If the contractor's interest
is terminable on short notice or if the right to mine exists only
for a short term even though not terminable for the term, the
contractor will probably not achieve economic interest status.39 The
Tax Court has approved a two year term40 and arguably disapproved
a one year term.42 However, the Fifth Circuit 2 and the Court
of Claims43 have recently held terminability on 30 day notice not
to be disqualifying if formal and substantive leasehold rights are
otherwise vested in the contractor. Two of the three judges on
Fifth Circuit panel also require that the contractor satisfy the "es-
sentiality" test of Southwest Exploration (discussed, infra) at least
if the lease is terminable on short notice. The other cases, however,
raise the question whether the duration of the interest transferred
to the operator must be of sufficient duration to permit a mining
to exhaustion. The tax court case involving the two year interest
merely stated that taxpayer-contractor could in that time mine a
substantial portion of the coal, not all. The case involving the one
year term doesn't discuss the question. A recent Tenth Circuit de-
cision44 concluded that an irrevocable right which was for a short
but not an immediately ascertainable period, was too short. It ap-
pears that if the period is not terminable by transferor at will
or after a short notice period, the period should not be disqualifying
primarily because in the sale 'lease cases the courts and revenue
service have concluded that a transfer of any definite quantity of
mineral can constitute a sale of mineral and therefore a transfer
of an economic interest.4 5 If transferor to contractor desires to
terminate, then to be safe, make termination contingent on speci-
39. Constantino v. C.I.R., 445 F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1971) ; Rissler & McMurray Co., Inc.
v. United States, 32 AFTR 2d 73-5191 (10th Cir. 1973) ; Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.
571 (1967) ; Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969); Winters Coal Co., 57 T.C. 249
(1971), rev'd. 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Kenneth Witmer, P-I1 T.C. M-MO 69, 286;
REV. RUL. 73-83, 1973-1 CuM. BuLL. 307.
40. Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571, 580 (1967).
41. See Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957, 968 (1969).
42. Winters Coal Co., Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 995, 996 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g
57 T.C. 249.
43. Bakertown Coal Co., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633, 641 (1973).
44. Rissler & McMurray Co. v. United States, 32 AFTR 2d 73-5194 (10th Cir. 1973).
45. REV. RUL. 69-466. 1969-2 CUM. BuLL. 140. See P. MlAxFis-D, supra, note 19, at 155-72.
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fled acts of misfeasance by contractor. Thereby contractor retains
control of the duration of the interest.
The Paragon Jewel case raised the question whether the eco-
nomic interest status is affected by contractor's being given the
right to terminate at wil. 46 Clearly, if such were the case, most of
the oil and gas leasing transactions would be upset taxwise since a
common provision included in such leases today enables the lessee
to surrender the lease at will. Countless transactions involving such
have not even been questioned on such basis. As a practical matter,
the conclusion that the risk of production (and capital recovery
thereby) is on the transferee would only be in question for the rea-
son of terminablity when transferee's rights are terminable by trans-
feror at will with minimal or no notice. The fact that transferee
can conclude his own interest does not in any way preclude him
from retaining his interest and looking thereto for a return of his
capital if he so wills.
C. OWNERSHIP IN PLACE
This requirement imposed by the Parsons and Paragon Jewel
cases would appear to properly be the conclusion rather than the.
major premise of the syllogism unless the Court is requiring a for-
mal transfer of property rights which defies a well-settled precept
of the Supreme Court eschewing the exaltation of form over sub-
stance.Y No decision or ruling subsequent to the two cases has, to
this commentator's knowledge, employed this factor for purposes
other than the conclusion to the two part definition of economic in-
terest in Palmer v. Bender.4 8 There is no indication that the courts
or the revenue service will not continue to look through form to sub-
stance by examining all the factors and then conclude that a tax-
payer either does or does not have an interest in the minerals in
place.
D. FIXED PRICE PER UUIT OF PRODUCTION
Although the fixed price per unit conclusion of the two decisions
has some justification in the abstract since such a formula does not
relate directly to value, and thus could be payable by reason of the
personal covenant despite a decline in value of the mineral to a
point insufficient to meet the "royalty" obligation; nevertheless, the
same fact did not vitiate economic interest treatment in a prior Su-
preme Court case" and the conclusion appears inconsistent with the
46. 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
47. E.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
48. 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
49. Bankers Pocohantas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 808 (1932).
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regulations.5 0 Viewing the question in perspective, there are several
other well-settled examples of payments not directly related to pro-
duction being treated as production for purposes of the depletion al-
lowance. The first is bonus, which can be depletable despite the lack
of sufficient production to even equal it.51 Other examples are mini-
mum royalty and other payments such as ad valorem tax payments
which are treated in certain circumstances as minimum royalty and
depletable.52
Nevertheless, in this context, the use of a fixed price per unit
formula for royalty may well vitiate economic interest treatment at
least where in effect the contractor is the owner of the royalty, i.e.,
where as in Paragon Jewel and Parsons the contractor turns over
the mined mineral to the transferor subject to the fixed price per
unit payable to him, and where the mining contractor formally ac-
quires the 'leasehold or fee rights in the mineral but must sell it
back to transferor at a fixed price per unit.
5 8
E. ESSENTIALTY
If the contractor-operator is to be in the chain of title to the
mineral fee or leasehold, then this element originally developed in
Southwest Exploration and reapplied by the Supreme Court in Para-
gon Jewel is probably not relevant 4 unless the Court of Claims
analysis discussed below is perpetuated. Thus the question arises
when the party who is a stranger to the title to the operating in-
terest receives an interest other than mineral fee or leasehold.
The Bankline facts and holding, which involved one not in the
chain of title to the operating interest performing some post-extrac-
tion process in consideration for what would appear to be a royalty
type interest in combination with the Southwest Exploration test of
essentiality to production, have been adopted by at least the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits55 and the Court of Claims.
56 The Fifth Circuit57
and the Court of Claims" have held in these cases that an agree-
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5).
51. Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934). Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a) (2). See P.
MAXFIELD, supra, note 19, at 92-104.
52. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Donnelly, 21 AFTR 2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1968)
Handelman V. U.S., 357 F.2d 694 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ; John McLean, 54 T.C. 569 (1970). See P.
MAXFIELD, supra note 19, at 107-11.
53. See cases cited note 64 and text accompanying note 64, infra.
54. See Rxv. RuL. 73-32, 1973-1 CUM. BULL. 301.
55. Scofield v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 268 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1959). In Omer v. United
States. 829 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964), taxpayer owned the surface but not the underlying
coal. He allowed the owner of the coal to use the surface for mining in consideration for
a fixed price per ton of coal mined. The Court applied the Southwest Exploration essen-
tiality test and concluded that taxpayer had a depletable economic interest.
56. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ; Tidewater Oil Co.
v. United States, 677 CCH Ct. Cl. Comm'r Report (1967) ; CBN Corp. v. United States,
828 F.2d 316 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ; 364 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ; 388 F.2d 337 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
57. 268 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1959).
58. $39 F.2d 633, 638-39 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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ment by a gas processor with a gas producer to process producer's
gas in consideration for a percentage of gross sales proceeds of pro-
cessed gas does not give the processor a depletable economic in-
terest because of the lack of essentiality to the production process.
The revenue -service in a 1968 ruling dealing with a similar gas pro-
cessing fact situation relied on Bankline without resorting to the es-
sentiality test of Southwest Exploration to conclude that the gas pro-
cessor did not possess an economic interest but was rather merely
a gas purchaser. 59 Also the Court of Claims has denied depletion to
one operator who transferred his production oil allowable to another
operator in consideration for that other operator's paying the trans-
feror a stated price per barrel produced varying with the posted sale
price of the oil. Here again the Court of Claims concluded that the
transferor's contribution to the transferee in consideration for the
production (or proceeds therefrom) received back was only essential
to the extraction of part and not all of the oil and therefore the
transferor's interest was not a depletable economic interest.60
In view of the decisions discussed above, one who is not in the
chain of title to the operating interest (leasehold or mineral fee)
who agrees to perform some post-extraction process in consideration
for a non-operating interest such as a royalty or net profits inter-
est probably should not expect allowable depletion on such interest
in light of the lack of essentiality to the extraction or production
process. In addition Paragon Jewel threatens the depletability of
such interests even if the activity to be performed is an extraction
process, or possibly even a pre-extraction (development) process,
because the Court concluded that the mining activity performed there
was not essential. 61 This creates some uncertainty in view of the
long standing treatment of sharing arrangements.6 2 Perhaps Para-
gon Jewel and Southwest Exploration can be reconciled with the
sharing arrangement doctrine in addition to other ways on the ground
that the essentiality test should be applied only to the production or
extraction and post-extraction stages and not to the exploration and
development stages of mineral operations, i.e., those stages with
which the sharing arrangement is involved.6 8
59. REV. RUL. 68-330, 1968-1 CUm. BuLL. 291.
60. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 633, 638-39 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
61. In Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 348 F.2d 921 (1965), the
Court of Claims construed Paragon Jewel as holding that the contractor's contribution in
Paragon was not essential since other contractors were availabe.
62. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 636(a), however, should prevent such question where the
sharing arrangement involves a production payment.




Nevertheless, based on the cases discussed above, the tax treat-
ment of the following situation would appear clearcut:
A, who has a mineral lease on Blackacre, transfers to B
for an unfettered cash consideration, a royalty of 10 cents
per ton on the mineral mined by A.
B has two strikes against him or her. First, B's royalty is set at
a fixed price per unit rather than a percentage. Secondly and more
significantly, B's contribution, being unfettered cash, would seem to
be even less of an essential contribution to production than the con-
tribution of the contractor in Paragon who was accomplishing the
production work. Nevertheless, the regulations provide that B has an
economic interest.6 4 Yielding to one's impulse at this point would
probably be justified, but clearly not constructive.
Perhaps the contractor who is a stranger to the title and who
desires a depletable interest might bargain for an undivided share
in the operating interest as an alternative course of action. This
course of action was approved by the Tax Court in 194865 for a gas
processor who was assigned an undivided interest in the heavier hy-
drocarbons in place by the leaseholder. The Tax Court answered the
Commissioner's Bankline argument of no control over the produc-
tion process by noting that he was assigned an undivided interest
in the specified minerals in place.6e The Court made no express
reference to the chain of title distinction that was developing in the
Supreme Court. 67 However, the result was certainly consonant with
that distinction, i.e., one who has an interest in -the mineral fee or
leasehold has a depletable economic interest., However, the reve-
nue service early indicated its disapproval of the holding by nonacqui-
escing.69
If the chain of title concept had been adhered to, however ar-
bitrary it might be, tax planners still could have achieved some
certainty by placing the contractor in the chain of title and thereby
avoiding the application of the essentiality test of Southwest Ex-
ploration. However, the two Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.
v. United States70 decisions appear to have applied the essentiality
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b) (4) (i) ex. 3.
65. Hudson v. Commissioner, 11 T.C 1042 (1948).
66. Id. at 1049.
67. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1) (1954).
69. 1949-1 CUm. BULL. 5.
70. 348 F.2d 921 (Ct. C1. 1965) ; 366 F.2d 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Simplot Company was In
the business of mining and manufacturing phosphate rock. It found substantial, reserves of
It on an Indian reservation in Idaho; unfortunately, however, it was overlain by phos-
phate shale which required a very expensive beneficiation process through the use of elec-
tric furnaces to extract the phosphorus. The Interior Department was only willing to aP-
467
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test to a contractor who arguably was placed in the chain of title
to the leasehold by reason of the contract. The serious problem that
is raised by these cases in light of the court's apparent holding that
the contractor and not the lessee owned the operating interest is that
the essentiality test might be applied even to one in the chain of
title. The obvious question unanswered is what approach would be
taken by the Court of Claims where the contractor owns not only
in substance but also in form the minerals in place, e.g., by a for-
mal sublease. Despite the conclusions to be drawn from these cases,
it would seem unlikely that any court would apply the essentiality
test in such circumstances.7
These are several caveats if the contractor is to achieve eco-
nomic interest status by being placed in the chain of title based on
the Supreme Court decisions discussed above and the lower court
decisions interpreting them. Additionally, the revenue service has
prove the mineral lease if Simplot or an associate constructed the necessary equipment to
process the phosphate shale. Taxpayer finally agreed to process the phosphate shale. Tax-
payer finally agreed with Simplot to incur the ten to twenty million dollar investment and
Simplot agreed to supply taxpayer with all its needs receiving from taxpayer one dollar
per ton. Simplot guaranteed taxpayer the twenty-five year supply needed to recover its
investment. The agreement also permitted taxpayer to take over operation of the mine If
Simplot failed to supply taxpayer's needs. The agreement was to remain in effect as long
as the mining leases were in effect and taxpayer had the right to correct any default by
Simplot in order to keep the leases running.
The question in the first Food Machinery case was whether taxpayer should be al-
lowed a depletion deduction. The Court of Claims in this author's opinion muddied the
waters by deciding the question on two basic grounds. The apparent first and confusing
basis is that of essentiality to the lease. The Court noted that taxpayer presented a stronger
case for depletion here than in Southwest Exploration since not only was taxpayer's contri-
bution a sine qua non to the lease but also taxpayer had in effect ultimate control over the
extraction. The second basis appears to be that taxpayer in effect acquired the operating
interest, i.e., the leasehold, or the ownership of the phosphate shale in place by reason of
the agreement.
The second Food Machinery case involved the question of who depletes on the one
dollar per ton which taxpayer paid, to Simplot after Simplot extracted the phosphate shale
and delivered it to the taxpayer for processing. The Court held that even though Simplot
was the ostensible lessee under the lease from the Indians, taxpayer and not Simplot should
take the depletion since, first, becacse of the agreement taxpayer, in effect, owned the
minerals in place, and second, that Simplot's position was no different from that of the
contract miner's position in the Paragon Jewel case. This conclusion is even more anoma-
lous if one recalls that Simplot was held, to have been in the chain of title.
The Tenth Circuit in 1967 in Utah Salt Co. v. Wise, 270 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1967),
decided a case adversely to the contractor on the depletion question which case involved
facts similar to those in the Food Machinery cases except that, first, the contractor's con-
tribution was not essential to the ostensible mineral fee owner's mining operation. Sec-
ondly, the ostensible mineral fee owner only guaranteed a five year supply of mineral to
the contractor and there was no provision for the contractor's taking over the mining opera-
tion If the former failed to adequately supply the contractor's needs. Factually the case
arguably is distinguishable from the Food Machinery cases on both grounds of the deci-
sions in the latter cases because of the lack of essentiality and because of the lack of suf-
ficient control over the mining operation to, in effect, constitute the contractor as the
owner of the minerals in place. None the less the Court simply noted that the taxpayer did
not have an interest in place and was surely a purchaser of the mined mineral because the
owner did the mining and not the contractor without looking at the factors examined in the
Food Machinery cases which permitted the Court there to determine that in effect the con-
tractor and not the ostensible owner was the owner of the minerals in place. One eminent
author has suggested that Utah Salt and the Food Machinery cases are inconsistent. Wil-
liams, "The Economic Interest Concept," P-H Oil and Gas Taxes, § 1010 (1967). Seelalso
Winters Coal Co., Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974), wherein, the essen-
tiality test was applied to a lease interest.
71. Ptrv. RUL. 73-32, 1973-1 Cum. BULL. 301, indicates that the revenue service is not
questioning such transactions.
SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS
recently provided a model in a ruling for providing the contractor
with an economic interest by placing him in the chain of title.7 2 The
ruling talks in terms of the "two essential criteria of an economic
interest for coal mining contractors," and seemingly ignores, the
balances of the list of factors set forth in Parsons and Paragon.
First, if the contractor is intended to receive a formal and substan-
tive operating interest, e.g., through lease or sublease, there should
be either a sufficiently long term or primary term in the lease or
the right to ,mine to exhaustion. The ruling prescribes that the in-
terest of the contractor must not be terminable at will or upon
short or nominal notice.
7 8
Second, the contractor should be given the right to sell the min-
eral to anyone at its fair market value with provision for a royalty
interest being retained by the lessor of the interest if continued par-
ticipation is desired by the latter. If lessor insists on taking the
whole supply of the mined mineral, the formula for payment to the
contractor ought to be the fair market of the mineral less whatever
royalty or other continuing interest is retained by the lessor. If les-
sor and contractor agree that the latter is to sell to the former at a
fixed price per unit, the revenue service will probably successfully
contend that the transaction is a contract to mine giving contractor
merely an economic advantage and not a depletable economic in-
terest,7 4 i.e., a mere fee arrangement for the mining services.
If it is decided that the contractor cannot obtain an economic
interest because of other business requirements of the agreement,
the owner of the operating interest should take care to cast the
agreement so as to obtain a depletion deduction on the full value
of the particular mineral at the surface with then a concomitant
sect-ion 162 deduction to the mineral prior to the owner's losing title
thereto. Because of the 1938 Supreme Court decision of Helvering v.
Mountain Producer's Corporation,75 only the amount actually re-
ceived by owner is depletable. Thus the owner should avoid pay-
ing the contractor in kind for his services whether the latter pur-
chases all or part of the mineral or not. Rather the transaction
72. Id.
73. Id. See text accompanying notes 33-37, supra.
74. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965); Parsons v. Smith,
359 U.S. 215 (1959); Ramey v. Commissioner, 398 F.2d 478 (1968); Mullins v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 571 (1967); Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969); Winter's Coal
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 249 (1971), rev'd 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974); Con-
stantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971) ; REV. RUL. 73-32, 1973-1 CUM. BULL.
307.
75. 303 U.S. 376 (1938). The result is conceptually acceptable if the other participant
In the sharing of the minerals has an economic interest. However, if such other participant
does not have an economic interest, the result is anomalous in that depletion is lost. If
title to minerals in place does not pass for tax purposes and If the contractor ends up with
title, then title must have passed after production or extraction. Clearly these services by
the contractor were not gratuitous. So it would seem that their value added in the produc-
tion of the 2nine-al should have been included in the taxpayer-mineral property owner's
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should be cast so that the services are paid for in cash (whether,
in fact, out of sales proceeds or not) and that the mineral sale
agreement, if any, with the contractor is a separate transaction.
So from a planning point of view, there are several alternatives
which might avoid the difficulties presented in the cases discussed
above if the contractor is not in the chain of title and the parties
prefer his possessing an economic interest. First, he can be given
the formal and substantive operating interest in the mineral in ques-
tion by deed, lease, or sublease or an undivided share therein by
deed, though the latter suggestion is troublesome in light of the rev-
enue service's nonacquiescence in the Hudson case.76 If the trans-
feror retains a formal and substantive royalty or net profits interest,
preferably measured by a percentage of gross or net proceeds rather
than a fixed price per unit to avoid the problems discussed above,
there should be no problem because the transferor is in the chain
of title. Secondly, especially if the relationship is a continuing one,
the parties might consider a partnership with a negotiated division
of the various tax and non-tax attributes. Thirdly, the parties may
consider a joint owner sharing arrangement if the contractor is to
perform either exploration or development type and not exclusively
extraction or post-extraction work.
77
gross income from property. See James P. Evans, 11 T.C. 726 (1948), wherein depletable
gross income from property was reduced on the alternative grounds of Mountain Producers
Corporation and that the activity performed was manufacturing rather than mining. The
Evans case is the basis for disallowing depletion on minerals produced and used by pro-
ducer in production process. See also, Roundup Coal Mining Co., 20 T.C. 388 (1953), for an
application of the same principle. However, the result in the latter situation is not obtained
where the mineral produced is used by an integrated producer in a manufacturing process.
See Woodtward Iron Co. v. Patterson, 73 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ala. 1959) (coal produced and
used in manufacturing pig iron). Additionally, the result has not applied in the ad vaiorem
tax situation wherein lessee pays lessor's taxes. See Burt v. United States, 170 F. Supp.
953 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Higgins v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 161 (1959). Also, the result Is not
obtained in the "innocent trespassor" situation, Estate of Thomas E. Arnett v. Commis-
sioner, 31 T.C. 320 (1958) (wherein the latter was allowed an offset from the damages of
his production expense and yet the owner took depletion on the gross production before'
the offset).
76. 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 5, See REv. RUL. 72-32, 1973-1 CUM. BULL. 301.
77. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cums. BULL. 214. See, P. MAXFIELD, supra, note 19, at 263 et
seq. for a discussion of sharing arrangements.
